The Ayatollah’s Last Stand? As Iran Protests, Uprising, Elite Fear, and a Nation on the Edge

Ayatollah Khamenei’s Hardline Response to Iran’s Unrest

As violent protests continue to erupt across Iran, Ali Khamenei, the Ayatollah of the Islamic Republic, has responded with a familiar but increasingly severe message: dissent will not be tolerated. In a recent address, Khamenei warned that protesters “must be put in their place,” language that many observers interpret as a green light for intensified crackdowns by security forces.

The demonstrations, fueled by deep frustration over political repression, economic collapse, and systemic corruption, have spread well beyond isolated cities. Protesters represent a broad cross-section of Iranian society, including students, workers, women, and ethnic minorities. Rather than acknowledging these grievances, Khamenei has framed the unrest as a foreign-backed conspiracy designed to weaken Iran from within.

Central to his response is the accusation that the United States and its allies are encouraging and assisting protesters. Khamenei has explicitly warned Washington against what he describes as “interference,” claiming that any support—whether rhetorical, diplomatic, or technological—amounts to hostile action against the Iranian state. Such statements are not new, but their intensity reflects growing anxiety within the regime as protests persist despite repeated crackdowns.

By shifting blame outward, Iran’s leadership seeks to rally loyalists and justify the use of force. State media has echoed the Ayatollah’s rhetoric, portraying protesters as rioters or traitors rather than citizens demanding change. Human rights groups, however, report widespread arrests, injuries, and deaths as security forces attempt to reassert control.

Khamenei’s reaction underscores a defining feature of Iran’s political system: dissent is treated as a security threat rather than a political signal. While threats and repression may suppress protests temporarily, they do little to address the underlying causes driving Iranians into the streets. As economic pressure mounts and public trust erode, the gap between the regime’s hardline posture and the demands of its people continues to widen—raising serious questions about how long force alone can maintain stability.

During his presidency, Donald Trump adopted one of the most confrontational foreign-policy postures in recent U.S. history toward both Iran and Venezuela, framing each as a national-security threat that required pressure, deterrence, and decisive action rather than accommodation.

On Iran, Trump made stopping a potential nuclear weapons program a central objective. He withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, arguing that the deal failed to permanently block Iran’s path to a bomb and did not address ballistic missiles or regional militancy. His administration imposed sweeping sanctions on Iran, targeting oil exports, banking, and key regime figures. While the U.S. did not conduct large-scale bombing of Iran itself, Trump authorized targeted military actions and deterrent strikes against Iranian-backed forces after attacks on U.S. personnel and interests, most notably signaling a willingness to use force to enforce red lines. The strategy was designed to raise the cost of nuclear escalation while avoiding full-scale war.

Trump took a similarly uncompromising stance toward Venezuela, accusing its leadership of transforming the country into a narco-state. His administration sanctioned the regime of Nicolás Maduro, cutting off access to the U.S. financial system.

Nicolás Maduro, the president of Venezuela, was captured by U.S. forces during a military operation and transported to New York to face federal charges. In a major escalation of tensions, U.S. military forces conducted coordinated airstrikes and a ground extraction operation in Caracas on January 3, 2026, codenamed “Operation Absolute Resolve,” which resulted in Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, being taken into custody and flown to the U.S. to face indictment on narco-terrorism and drug trafficking charges in the Southern District of New York. Wikipedia+1

President Donald Trump and senior U.S. officials said that Maduro’s capture followed months of planning and that he will be prosecuted in U.S. courts for alleged involvement in conspiracy to export cocaine and other crimes. After landing at Stewart Air National Guard Base, Maduro was then taken into federal custody in Brooklyn, New York, where he is expected to appear before a judge. This move marked a rare instance of a sitting head of state being apprehended and brought to the U.S. for criminal prosecution. Wikipedia+1

Trump also stated that the United States would oversee Venezuela temporarily, seeking a safe and “judicious transition” to new leadership while asserting U.S. interests — including control of energy infrastructure and counter-drug efforts. The action has drawn widespread international attention, prompting debate about legality, sovereignty, and regional stability.

Weighing Washington’s Options Crackdown Intensifies - Iran Protests

As Iranian demonstrations continue to meet force from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, attention has turned to how the U.S. president might respond—whether through direct action against the regime or by backing Iranian citizens facing violence. Historically, Washington has tried to balance deterrence with restraint, signaling support for human rights while avoiding steps that could trigger a wider conflict.

Publicly, U.S. administrations have condemned repression and emphasized the right to peaceful protest. Statements, targeted sanctions, and diplomatic pressure have been the most consistent tools. Sanctions aimed at individuals and entities linked to abuses—particularly within the Guard—are designed to impose costs without harming civilians. In parallel, the United States has supported efforts to keep internet access open, arguing that information flows help protect protesters and document abuses.

The likelihood of direct military action against Iran remains low absent attacks on U.S. personnel or allies. Presidents have repeatedly signaled that force would be used to defend American lives and enforce clear red lines, not to intervene in Iran’s internal politics. This approach reflects lessons from past conflicts: overt intervention can unite hardliners, undermine domestic reform movements, and escalate unpredictably.

That said, credible deterrence matters. When violence against civilians' spikes, Washington often tightens economic and diplomatic pressure, coordinates with allies, and elevates accountability efforts at international forums. Cyber measures and maritime enforcement have also been used to constrain destabilizing activities linked to the Guard, while avoiding open war.

Backing Iranian citizens, then, is more likely to take the form of sustained political support, targeted sanctions, and multilateral diplomacy rather than direct intervention. The goal is to raise the cost of repression and keep space open for civil society without handing the regime a pretext for escalation.

Ultimately, U.S. policy hinges on events on the ground. If repression intensifies without external provocation, Washington’s response will likely remain calibrated and indirect. If American interests are threatened, the posture could harden. For now, the strategy points toward pressure and protection of principles—firm signals, measured tools, and an effort to avoid turning Iran’s internal crisis into a regional war.

Paths to Change in Iran: Prospects, Constraints, and the Question of Violence

The question of whether Iranian citizens could overturn the dominance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is widely debated among scholars and policymakers. Any serious discussion must distinguish between analysis and advocacy. What follows is a high-level assessment of plausible pathways and constraints—not a blueprint for action.

Historically, durable political change in Iran would require a convergence of pressures rather than a single trigger. Analysts point to three broad conditions: sustained public mobilization across regions and classes; fractures within elite institutions that reduce the state’s capacity to repress; and a credible, inclusive political alternative that reassures citizens and insiders alike about the future.

Without all three, uprisings tend to be contained or reversed.

Violence is a critical variable. Nonviolent mass movements have, in some cases, widened participation and attracted defections by lowering the perceived cost of change. Conversely, widespread violence can harden security responses and consolidate power around the Guard. Most experts therefore assess that a violent route carries high risks of civil conflict and state fragmentation, while a predominantly nonviolent route—though slower—offers a better chance of broad legitimacy and international support.

Overthrowing the current system would also hinge on elite calculations. If economic strain, sanctions, and legitimacy losses raise the costs of repression above the costs of compromise, splits within governing networks could emerge. Absent such fractures, the Guard’s organizational cohesion remains a formidable barrier.

Redirecting governance toward a more Western-style model akin to the United States would require more than leadership change. Comparative experience suggests the need for constitutional reform, civilian control of security forces, independent courts, competitive elections, protections for minority rights, and an economy governed by transparent rules rather than patronage. These shifts typically unfold over years, not months, and depend on domestic consensus rather than external imposition.

In short, the likelihood of regime change hinges on alignment among society, elites, and institutions. Whether change occurs with limited violence or descends into coercion depends on how those pressures interact—and whether a credible, inclusive political future is visible to Iranians themselves.

Will the Ayatollah Survive Such a Transition?

For Ali Khamenei, survival through a transition is far less likely than survival of the regime itself.

In most historical cases where ideological leaders preside over collapsing systems, outcomes fall into three categories:

• Graceful withdrawal with immunity (rare)

• Symbolic retention during a managed transition (uncommon)

• Removal or death before consolidation (most common)

Khamenei’s position is particularly vulnerable because:

• He embodies the system rather than merely administering it

• His authority is religious, political, and symbolic

• There is no credible path for him to remain legitimate in a pluralist system

If Iran transitions toward a freer model, it is unlikely that Khamenei would remain a public figure within it. The more plausible outcomes are retirement under protection, house arrest, or death before or during transition. Survival in the sense of “witnessing” change is possible; survival as a participant is not.

The Most Likely Scenario (If Change Happens)

If Iran becomes freer, it is most likely to occur through:

• A post-Khamenei succession rupture

• Negotiated elite realignment rather than mass overthrow

• Gradual liberalization rather than instant Western-style democracy

In that scenario, Khamenei does not “survive” the transition politically—even if he survives biologically.

Iran becoming freer is plausible but not inevitable. Ali Khamenei surviving to see it is possible but improbable—and surviving within it is almost inconceivable.

What Could a Freer Iran Mean for the World?

A free Iran—defined by accountable governance, civil liberties, and rule of law—would likely have transformative effects well beyond its borders. Economically, reintegration into global markets could unlock one of the world’s most resource-rich and educated societies, expanding trade in energy, petrochemicals, manufacturing, technology, agriculture, and tourism while restoring Iran as a reliable node in Eurasian supply chains. With sanctions lifted under credible reforms, international firms would gain access to a large consumer market and a strategic transit corridor linking Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia, easing inflationary pressures and diversifying global energy supplies.

Diplomatically, normalization could reduce regional proxy conflicts and lower risk premiums across the Middle East. Perhaps most consequential would be the prospect of peace and normalization with Israel, which—if paired with security guarantees and mutual recognition—could de-escalate long-running hostilities, curb arms races, and catalyze wider Arab–Israeli détente, reshaping the region from confrontation toward cooperation.

A freer Iran could also help stabilize Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen by dialing down militia networks and supporting sovereign institutions, thereby improving humanitarian outcomes and reducing refugee flows. Globally, such a transition would strengthen nonproliferation by reducing incentives for nuclear brinkmanship and restoring confidence in diplomacy. Soft-power dividends would follow as Iranian culture, science, and entrepreneurship reconnect with the world, contributing to innovation, academic exchange, and people-to-people ties.

For climate and development, Iran’s technical capacity could accelerate regional clean-energy projects, water management, and disaster resilience. Finally, a successful transition would send a powerful signal that reform through institutions can deliver prosperity and peace, reinforcing international norms and offering a constructive model for conflict-prone regions—benefiting not only Iranians, but the stability and growth of the global system as a whole.